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Abstract 
 
This research aims to explains association between financial expertise of directors to directors compensation and 
directors turnover of Indonesia non financial company in 2011-2012. Using ordinary least square regression we 
used four variables to define financial expertise of directors: age of the directors, tenure of the directors, the post-
graduate degree (MBA), and the accounting certification (CPA). However, this study found no association financial 
expertise to compensation and directors turnover. We hope this study can contributes to financial expertise, 
compensation, and turnover literature. We also provide implications for companies in determining the compensation 
of directors based on financial expertise. Further research can be improve by add new variabel such as complexcity 
and board size. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
  Begins with sarbanes oxley act 2002 that signed 
in chicago, an important role director and chief 
financial officer became the most topic discussed. One 
of the mai contents of Sarbanes Oxley Act is to require  
CEO and CFO to certify the validity of financial 
reporting(Suradi, 2012).  
The purpose of creating financial statements is to 
generate information became useful information for 
making decisions. In preparing the financial statements, 
Indonesia adopted the new standard of GAAP to IFRS. 
Indonesia is gradually adopting IFRS. Starting from 
2008 until 2011 as transition period of period, and full 
adopted IFRS in 2012. 
This research will use 2011 and 2012 as research 
year. In that year all members of the board of directors 
are in the same position, where the directors must be 
able to understand, apply and provide training to 
members in implementing the new standards. In this 
position, the board of directors can provide expertise in 
applying new standards, so financial expertise of 
directors becomes the key of preparing accurate 
financial statements for the year. 
The existence of Sarbanes oxley act has enhanced 
research related to the role of the directors on the 
quality of financial statements. Loyeung (2014) 
examines the relationship between the financial 
director's accounting talents, compensation and change 
of finance director. Woning (2014) examines the 
relationship between the complexity of the work of the 
finance director to the compensation and performance 
of the finance director. Burks (2007) examines the 
relationship between the Sarbanes Oxley Act's impact  
on re-reporting and compensation of the chief and 
financial directors. Sun (2015) examines the 
relationship between accounting expert financial 
finance (CFO's financial expertise) and concerns about 
corporate governance. Darmadi (2013) examines the 
effect of board member education on corporate 
performance in developing countries such as Indonesia. 
This research is an extension of Loyeung's 
previous research (2014) which examines the financial 
director's accounting talents, compensation of finance 
director, and director’s turnover. This study differs 
from previous research in several respects. First, this 
research is conducted in Indonesia which is one of the 
developing Asian countries. Second, this study uses 
financial expertise as an independent variable. Third, 
previous research focused on financial director (CFO) 
while in this study focused on the board of directors. 
Our study is important in the following ways. First, 
this research is interesting because there is still little 
literature and discussion that discuss about financial 
expertise especially in Indonesia. Secondly, this topic 
becomes very interesting because of the growing issue 
of Sarbanes Oxley Act or commonly known by the 
acronym SOX / SOA and the change of accounting 
standards in Indonesia. This study entitled the 
influence of financial accounting of directors to 
compensation and directors turnover in non-financial 
companies in Indonesia. 
1.2 Formulation of the problem 
This study aims to examine the effect of financial 
expertise of directors on compensation and directors 
turnover in Indonesia. This study provides the literary 
benefit for the development theory because of the lack 
of literature on financial expertise, directors 
compensation and change of directors in Indonesia. In 
addition, for the research company it can be useful for 
practitioners in applying compensation and change of 
directors by considering financial expertise of directors. 
1.3 Research purposes 
This study aims to develop Loyeung's previous 
research (2014). This study aims to examine the effect 
of  fianancial expertise of directors on compensation 
and director’s turnover in Indonesia. This research is 
expected to give a new evidance for the financial 
expertise literature and give different results because 
it’s done in developing countries. 
1.4 Benefits of research 
This research provides the literary benefit for the 
development of theory because of the lack of literature 
on financial expertise, directors compensation and 
directors turnover in Indonesia. In addition to this 
research company can be useful for practitioners in 
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applying compensation and change of directors by 
considering fianancial expertise of directors. 
 
2. Theoretical Review 
 
2.1  Theoritical review 
Agency Theory 
When owner hires another party to perform a 
service in his compeny, there is an interest conflict with 
the related party. The owner of the entity is the 
principal and the other party employed is referred to as 
the agent. In performing its duties the principal 
delegates the authorization of decision-making in the 
hands of the agent. In a company, the shareholder as the 
principal and the chief executive as the agent. At the 
lower level the chief executive becomes principal and 
the manager of the business unit becomes his agent 
(Anthony, 2005).  
The agency theory assumes that all individuals act 
for their own interests. Agents are assumed to receive 
job satisfaction not only from financial compensation 
but also from additional directly involved in agency 
relations (Anthony, 2005). In this theory is known as 
agency problems. An agent is more likely to prioritize 
its interests compared with the interests of business or 
shareholders (Muharam, 2004). Therefore principal 
will provide compensation as a form of positive 
motivation to the agent. 
2.2  Research Accomplished 
The discussion of the relationship between 
principal and agents has become a very interesting and 
contentious topic. Beginning with the Enron, 
WorldCom, and other multinational case scandals, has 
sparked regulatory reforms related to agency 
responsibilities in reporting their corporate finances. 
Following the emergence of related scandals The 
responsibility of the agent in reporting the company's 
finances comes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or SOX / SOA 
regulation. This regulation contains provisions that one 
of them is the agents, especially the chief executive 
(CEO) and the financial director (CFO), must have 
accountable accounting principles. This sparked a lot 
of debate that assume that in carrying out its duties, a 
director must have talent or mastery in accounting. 
Burks (2007) investigated the impact of SOX and 
re-reporting on compensation and replacement of 
CEOs and CFOs. Berks (2007) found no significant 
association between CEO turnover to re-reporting after 
SOX, but there was a significant relationship between 
CEO turnover to SOX re-reporting. This supports that 
SOX rules that require the CEO and CFO to have 
accounting qualifications in financial reporting. 
Loyeung (2014) examined the relationship 
between CFO accounting talents on compensation and 
CFO turnover. In his research, Loyeung (2014) took 
accounting reporting error levels at the turn of US 
GAAP to IFRS as a measure of accounting talent 
variables. Loyeung (2014) found that there was a 
positive relationship Between CFO accounting talents 
on CFO compensation during IFRS transition period 
and during IFRS full adoption period. In addition 
Loyeung (2014) finds there is an inverse relationship 
between CFO accounting talents on CFO turnover in 
the transition year and full adoption years. 
Colli et.al (2016) examines the Earning 
Restatement, the Sarbanes Oxley Act, and the 
Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers. Colli et.al 
(2016) examines the relation of earnings reporting and 
the impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act on the 
disciplinary director of finance.Colli et . (2016) used a 
change of financial director as a result of the 
disciplinary action of the finance director.Colli et.al 
(2016) found that after the issuance of SOX regulations 
the finance director was more severe in making 
earnings reports than in the pre-SOX period. .al (2016) 
is the financial director asked to have more financial 
expertise to account for the report. 
Sun et.al (2014) examines CFO financial 
expertise and corporate governance concerns Evidence 
from S&P SmallCap 600 Index. Sun (2014) 
investigates the relationship between financial 
director's financial expertise on good corporate 
governance.In Sun's study (2014) CPA (Certificate 
Public Accountant), MBA (Master of Business 
Administration), tenure and age of finance director as 
a measurement tool to measure financial expertise. Sun 
(2014) found that negatively accounting skills of 
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finance director related to Concerns good 
governance.That is, in his research accounting skills of 
finance director can reduce the concerns of good 
corporate governance principles.This led investors to 
become confident with the company and lack of 
supervision from investors. 
Woning (2014) examines the effect of job 
complexity and performance of financial director on 
compensation of finance director. Woning research 
(2014) conducted in Indonesia. Woning (2014) uses 
company size, business segment, free cash flow, and 
long-term debt as a proxy to measure the complexity of 
work.And using the positive accrual discretionary, 
growth opportunities and age of the finance director to 
measure the performance of finance director.From the 
results of his research, woning 2014) found that the 
compensation of the finance director only had an effect 
on one of the measurement of the complexity of the 
work ie firm size, as well as the effect on one of the 
performance measures ie growth opportunities. CFO 
compensation has no effect on business segments, free 
cash flow, long-term debt, positive accrual 
discretionary, and CFO age. 
Darmadi (2013) examines the effect of board of 
director's education on company performance in 
Indonesia. Darmadi (2013) uses the proportion of CPA 
and postgraduate degrees that the board has as a proxy 
to measure the education of directors. In addition 
Darmadi (2013) separates the education of directors by 
dividing it into overseas graduates and graduates in the 
country. Darmadi (2013) found that directors with 
educational qualifications showed better performance 
than those without qualifications.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
 
IFRS is the biggest innovation in world of accounting. 
IFRS is considered able to add more comprehensive 
information quality than GAAP in accounting reporting 
(Krismiaji, 2016). Indonesia as a developing country 
started gradually in adopting IFRS. Started in 2008 and 
full adoption in 2012. The process of changing from 
GAAP to IFRS is increase demands for board of 
directors to learn new standards and take responsible in 
staff training, users, analysts, creditors, and investors. 
The impact of a error in adapting GAAP to IFRS is 
considered be an indicator of accounting talent 
(Loyeung, 2014). 
The accuracy of accounting reporting becomes 
the standard of information quality conveyed. 
Supriharin (2013) proves that IFRS adoption can 
improve the relevance of equity and profit values 
against stock prices. In process of adopting IFRS, the 
increase value in the financial statements is considered 
as a key to success level in implementing the new 
standards. This success level is can be evidence of the 
existence of financial expertise. Board directors with 
financial expertise are expected to be better implement 
new financial standards than directors who do not have 
financial expertise. In accordance with the idea that 
directors who have successfully implemented IFRS in 
the transitional year will receive greater compensation 
compared to the less successful directors of IFRS, the 
first hypothesis will show as follows: 
H1. There is positive association between the director’s 
financial expertise and director’s compensation level in 
transistion years. 
 Board of directors usually hired between 3 to 5 
years. One component in compensation usually 
consists of base pay and bonuses. Annual increases in 
basic salaries are usually determined on the basis of 
employment contracts. Therefore, in his research 
Loyeung (2014) did not expect a significant increase in 
total compensation from the transition year to the full 
adoption year. However, board of directors who has 
better peformance will get a higher bonus (Loyeung, 
2014). Bonus is a component that exists in total 
compensation. This will build the second hypothesis 
that the company will provide bonuses and raise greater 
compensation to board of directors with financial 
expertise than less financial expertise. Therefore, board 
of directors with financial expertise will receive a 
greater compensation increase from the company 
compared to the less financial expertise. 
H2. There is positive association between the director’s 
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financial expertise and increase of director’s 
compensation level in adoption years. 
 The lack of financial expertise can cause weak 
internal control of the company. Companies with weak 
internal controls which get lower compensation and 
experience will more frequent in board turnover (Wang, 
2010). This is similar with Loyeung's (2014), time of 
IFRS adoption is considered as momentum of a change 
in accounting standards. During the adoption period the 
directors are considered be in the same situation and 
are expected to implement the new standards better. 
Directors who have no expertise in applying new 
standards are likely to be replaced (Colli, 2016). This 
builds a third hypothesis, the board of directors with 
financial expertise will be able to implement the new 
standards and will be maintained by the company 
compared to the board of directors without the financial 
expertise.  
H3. There is negative association between the 
director’s financial expertise and director’s turnover in 
transistion years. 
 
4. Research Methods 
 
4.1 Population and Sample 
This research is a quantitative research whose data 
obtained through financial statements and annual 
reports of non-financial companies listed on the 
Indonesian stock exchanges. Samples will select on 
purposive sampling as follows: 
 
Table 1 Sample Characteristics 
Non-financial companies listed on IDX 2011 and 2012 235 
Less :  
Do not have complete annual report  56 
Using foreign currency 33 
Not explaining the profile of the board of directors 64 
Does not contain directors' compensation 31 
Total sample hypotheses 1, 2, 3 51 
 
The population that includes non-financial 
companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2011 and 
2012 are 253 companies. After selecting samples, 
there are 51 companies that meet the characteristics 
of sample. This research was conducted in Indonesia 
and used a sample of non-financial companies listed 
on the Indonesian stock exchange. Previous research 
was conducted in Europe, America and Australia. 
This research was conducted in Indonesia which is a 
developing country. Indonesiais different from 
previous research, it is hoped this research can add 
to the evidence of the influence of financial expertise 
on compensation and change of directors in 
developing countries. 
 
4.2 Types and Sources of Data 
The types and sources of data used in this study 
is secondary and historical data, so in the data 
collection techniques using data base collection 
techniques. Database retrieval technique is done to 
obtain secondary archive data. In this research, data 
archive technique obtained from the official website 
of Indonesia stock exchange. We collect data 
through historical data by accessing the official site 
of the Indonesian stock exchange. 
 
4.3 Data Collection Technique 
Sampling technique using non-random 
sampling method is purposive judgment sampling or 
sampling using special criteria. The purpose of this 
method is to take samples based on specific criteria 
based on certain considerations. purposive judgment 
sampling to avoid the imbalance of data between 
years to be studied. 
Samples taken must meet certain criteria.First 
sample must be non-financial companies because for 
financial companies there are different composition 
in financial reporting. Secondly, the sample must 
have complete financial information in its financial 
statements. Third, the sample must have data on the 
members of the board of directors ranging from 
name, title, term of office, and total amount of 
compensation to the board of directors. Fourth, the 
sample must be listed on the Indonesian stock 
exchanges in the two years studied ie the transition 
year 2011 and the year of full adoption 2012. 
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4.4 Research Model and Variables Measurment 
This study will use multiple regression model. 
Here is a multiple regression model that will be used 
to test the first and second hypothesis. 
Model Hipotesis 1: 
 
COMPt = β0 + β1 CPA + β2 MBA+ β3 TENURE 
+ β4 AGE + β5 SIZE……...(1) 
Model Hipotesis 2: 
 
∆COMPt+1 = β0 + β1 CPA + β2 MBA+ β3 TENURE 
+ β4 AGE + β5 SIZE……...(2) 
 
 
COMPt :Total of board direstors compensation in 
transition year (2011) 
∆COMPt+1 : Boards directors compensation increase 
In adoption year (2012) 
CPA :Proportion of Board directors Certified 
professional accountant.  
MBA :Proportion of magister Bussiness 
administration. 
TENURE  :Proportion of year service of directors 
AGE :Proportion of directors age 
SIZE :Size of company  
To test hypothesis 3, this study will use logistic 
regression model. Here is a logistic regression model 
that will be used to test the third hypothesis. 
Model Hipotesis 3: 
 
TURNOVER = β0 + β1 CPA + β2 MBA + β3 
TENURE + β4 AGE + β5 SIZE +  
ɛ ….………(3) 
 
TURNOVERt+1:Directors turnover in adoption year. 
CPA :Proportion of Board directors 
Certified professional accountant.  
MBA :Proportion of magister Bussiness 
administration. 
TENURE  :Proportion of year service of 
directors 
AGE :Proportion of directors age 
SIZE :Size of company  
 
Operational Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Directors' Compensation  
Compensation is all income in the form of 
money, goods directly or indirectly received by 
employees in return for services. Woning (2014) 
uses log of total compensatin as a proxy for 
compensation. Ulupui (2015) examines the effect of 
family ownership, directors & commissioners' 
closeness to the controlling owners of the 
compensation of directors and company 
commissioners in the Indonesian capital market also 
using log of total compensation as a proxy of 
compensation. In accordance with the previous 
research, this study will also use the natural log of 
the total compensation of the directors as the proxy 
of the directors compensation variable. 
Compensation Increase. 
Loyeung (2014) finds that the company will 
provide bonuses for and greater compensation 
increases to directors who successfully implement 
new financial standards in the company. Bonus is 
one of the components in compensation. A bonus 
increase will result in an increase in total 
compensation received by the board of directors. The 
increase in compensation will be measured using the 
difference in total compensation in 2012 and 2011. 
Directors’ Turnover 
 The board of directors is the person responsible 
for company. Board of commissioners entrust 
decision-making to the board of directors. The board 
of commissioners prefer board of directors who 
understand in accounting because in preparing and 
analyzing financial statements requires financial 
expertise (Zhao, 2016). Previous studies have argued 
that directors with poor accounting skills and error 
in reporting earnings are more often superseded by 
skilled directors. Substitution of the board of 
directors can be seen the company's annual report. 
The proxy for directors’ turnover shall be 
measured by directors’ turnover. Directors’s 
turnover is measured by matching the names of the 
board of directors in 2011 and 2012. If there is a 
change it will be given a value of one and if there is 
no change it will be given a value of zero.  
Independent Variaebel 
Financial expertise 
The independent variable of this research is 
financial expertise (financial expertise) were 
measured using the proportion of professional 
certification (CPA) board of directors, the proportion 
of post-graduate degree (MBA) board of directors, 
the directors working period (tenure) and ages of 
directors. If directors have accounting professional 
qualification (CPA) and post-graduate degree (MBA) 
then rated one and if not then given a zero value for 
each variable. Then the value of the accounting 
professional qualification (CPA) will be totaled and 
divided by the number of existing board members. 
The same thing applies to the variable glasses 
graduate (MBA). The tenure of the directors (tenure) 
will be measured by using a long-serving company 
and the age of the directors will be measured using 
the proportion of the age of the board of directors. 
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Variable Control 
Company size 
To support the research, this study used a 
control variable. The control variables used are the 
size of the company that will be measured using a 
natural log total assets (TA). Company size 
measured by total fixed assets and current assets 
acquired from the company's financial statements. 
Total assets have been frequently used as a measure 
of the size of the company in several studies. 
Companies that have a large size is more interested 
in hiring the director mememiliki keahlian.Selain 
large-sized enterprise is deemed better able to 
provide a great compensation to the board of 
directors (Loyeung, 2014). 
 
5. Results And Discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Based on the second table of descriptive 
statistics can know the number of samples to be 
tested as many as 51 companies. From the table of 
descriptive statistics can be seen in total 
compensation in 2011 have an average value of 
22.242, 18.5 maximum value, minimum value of 
25.9 and a standard deviation of 1.4803. Total 
compensation in 2012 have an average value of 
22.534, 26.3 maximum value and minimum value of 
19.7, and a standard deviation of 1.4447. 
The increase in the compensation of directors 
has an average value of 20.524, the maximum value 
of 25, the minimum value of 16.6, and a standard 
deviation of 1.9655. Substitution of directors has an 
average value of 0.451, the maximum value of 1, the 
minimum value of 0 and a standard deviation of 
0.5025. Age of directors in 2011 have an average 
value of 47.778 years, the maximum of 61.3 years, 
the minimum value of 30 and a standard deviation of 
5.5558. Age of directors in 2012 have an average 
value of 48.098 years, the maximum of 62.3 years, 
35.5 years minimum value, and a standard deviation 
of 5.5426. 
Period servant of directors in 2011 have an 
average value of 5,218 years, the maximum value of 
25.7 years, the minimum value 0 years, and the 
standard deviation of 5.4008. Period servant of 
directors in 2012 have an average value of 5.147 
years, 26.7 years maximum value, minimum value 0 
years, and the standard deviation of 4.9897. 
Accounting certification in 2011 have an average 
value of 0,020, the maximum 4, the minimum value 
of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.745. Accounting 
certification in 2012 have an average value of 0.019, 
the maximum value of 3, the minimum value of 0 
and a standard deviation of 0.709. Post-graduate 
degree in 2011 have an average value of 0,302, the 
maximum value of 1, the minimum value of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 0,2590.Gelar graduate in 2012 
have an average value of 0.331, the maximum value 
of 1, the minimum value 0, and standard deviation of 
0.2301. 
Total compensation of directors and directors 
using the nominal rupiah rise in full so as to simplify 
the data so that the data to be normal by using the 
natural logarithm. For ages directors and a man of 
directors using the unit of money later in proporsikan 
with the number of board members. accounting 
certification and post-graduate degree using a 
proportion of the number of members who have 
accounting certification and post-graduate degree. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Research Model 
  N Min Max mean Std. deviation 
COMP_t  51 18.5 25.9 22.242 1.4803 
COMP_ti 51 19.7 26.3 22.534 1.4447 
Ln_∆COMP 51 16.6 25.0 20.524 1.9655 
Turnover 51 0,00 1.0 .451 .5025 
AGE_t 51 30.0 61.3 47.778 5.5558 
AGE_ti 51 35.5 62.3 48.098 5.5426 
TENURE_t 51 0,00 25.7 5,218 5.4008 
TENURE_ti 51 0,00 26.7 5.147 4.9897 
CPA_t 51 0,00 0.4 0,020 .0745 
CPA_ti 51 0,00 0.3 0,019 .0709 
MBA_t 51 0,00 1.0 0,302 .2590 
MBA_ti 51 0,00 1.0 0.331 .2301 
Size_t 51 23.7 32.3 28.266 1.7093 
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SIZE_ti 51 23.8 32.3 28.327 1.6764 
Source: SPSS 17.0 
 
First Hypothesis Testing Results (H1) 
The first hypothesis in this study is the financial 
expertise of directors having an effect positively to 
the compensation of directors in transition (2011). 
 
Table 3 Results of regression test the first hypothesis 
  Dependent Variable = Compensation of Directors in 2011 
variables Regression coefficient t Count Sig 
constants 6.825 2.218 0,032 
AGE_t -0.011 -0.327 0,745 
TENURE_t 0,008 .227 0.821 
CPA_t -1.926 -0.824 0,414 
MBA_t 0,848 1,249 0.218 
size_t 
adjusted R2 
0.555 
 
5.227 
 
0,000 
0.352 
Regression   0,000 
Observation   51 
Source: SPSS 17.0 
Based on Table 3 the results of multiple 
regression test the first hypothesis, the value of the 
adjusted R2 of 0.352 which means that the 
variability of the compensation of directors in 2011 
can be explained by 35.2% by the age variable 
directors, past the man of directors, the accounting 
profession degree (CPA), and the title of the post 
bachelor (MBA) directors in 2011. the remaining 
64.8% is explained by other variables not included 
in the regression model. 
Under the influence of the simultaneous test (F 
test) was obtained calculated F value of 6,428 and 
0,000 levels in the regression sinifikansi smaller than 
0.05, which means that the independent variable 
financial expertise simultaneously affect variable 
compensation. However, financial expertise can 
simultaneously affect the variable compensation due 
to the directors of the significance of the size of the 
company tingtat 0,000 less than 0,005. If the record 
per variable, the variable age of directors (Age) 
significant at 0.745, Variable time servant of 
directors (Tenure) is significant at 0.821, CPA 
variables significant at 0,414, and an MBA variables 
significant at 0.218. The fourth significant value 
financial expertise variable value is greater than 0.05, 
so there is no variable financial expertise that can 
simultaneously affect the variable compensation of 
directors. The first hypothesis is not supported. 
Based on the partial test (t test) output results of the 
regression test first hypothesis can be inferred by the 
regression equation as follows: 
KOMPt = 6.825 to 1.926 CPA + 0,848 MBA + 0,008 
TENURE - 0,011 AGE + 0.555 SIZE 
The constant of 6.825 states that if the 
independent variables held constant, the total 
compensation of directors at 6.825. CPA negative 
regression coefficient 1.296, which means every 
variable CPA up one unit will reduce the 
compensation of directors amounted to 1,926 with 
the assumption that the other independent variables 
are fixed. MBA worth positive regression coefficient 
0.848, which means every variable MBA rose one 
unit will increase the compensation of directors 
amounted to 0,848 with the assumption that the other 
independent variables are fixed. 
Servants period is positive coefficient of 0.008, 
which means every time variable servant (Tenure) 
moved up one unit will increase the variable 
compensation of directors amounted to 0,008 with 
the assumption that the other independent variables 
are fixed. AGE negative regression coefficient of 
0.011, which means every variable AGE up one unit 
will reduce the compensation of directors amounted 
to 0,011 with the assumption that the other 
independent variables are fixed. Regression 
coefficient of firm size (Size) is positive 0.555 
means that every variable firm size (Size) moved up 
one unit will increase the variable compensation of 
directors amounted to 0.555 assuming other 
independent variables are fixed. 
Of the four variables that define financial 
expertise no positive effect on the variable 
compensation of directors. However, the control 
variables firm size have a significant effect in 
predicting the compensation of directors. This is in 
contrast with previous studies that examined the 
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financial director of financial expertise to the 
compensation of financial directors in the turn of the 
IFRS transition. 
Loyeung (2014) argues the greater the directors 
serving in his position, the better the decisions 
related to their responsibilities. Nourayi (2008) also 
reported the same thing associated time servant 
(Tenure) and ages of directors (Age) against 
compensation. Post-graduate degree (MBA) became 
one of the accounting variables that have a positive 
influence on the compensation of directors, MBA 
and CPA is used as a measurement of financial 
expertise based on the assumption that graduates 
master the business can provide knowledge about the 
business and also a better understanding of the 
accounting (Sun, 2013).  
However, there are some studies that show 
similar results to the study. Variable age of directors 
(AGE), accounting certification (CPA), the directors 
post-graduate degree (MBA), and a man of directors 
(Tenure) did not show the same results in previous 
studies. Nourayi (2008) found the compensation of 
directors is influenced significantly by the 
performance of directors but is not influenced by the 
length of time the man of the board of directors and 
ages of directors. Guner (2008) also found that the 
compensation of directors is not a significant 
increase to the directors who have financial 
expertise. 
This is because few samples of directors 
members holding accounting certification that the 
sample less representative of the population 
accounting for the certification test in this study. The 
same thing happened in post-graduate degree 
(MBA) in which not all members of the board of 
directors holds a post-graduate degree. In addition, 
only 35.2% variable financial expertise can explain 
compensation while the remaining 64.8% is 
explained by other variables not included in the 
financial expertise. From these results, the 
researchers concluded less capacity so that the 
sample variable financial expertise financial 
expertise in Indonesia are less able to explain the 
compensation of directors. 
Principal delegate authority to the directors in 
making decisions. In selecting directors, principals 
would prefer directors who have financial expertise 
and provide compensation as a form of motivation to 
increase profits. However, in this study did not show 
a positive effect of the financial expertise of directors 
of the compensation of directors. This study proves 
that the agency theory only a theory and have no 
effect on the control of management practitioners. 
This proves that the owner of the company did not 
apply the principle of agency in determining 
compensation. 
Second Hypothesis Testing Results (H2) 
The second hypothesis in this study is the 
financial expertise of directors (financial expertise) 
positive effect on the increase in the compensation 
of directors in full adoption. 
 
Table 4 Results of the second hypothesis regression test 
  Dependent Variable = Increase in Compensation of Directors In the Year 2012 
variables Regression coefficient Sig 
constants 1,273 0.754 
AGE_t -0.024 0.615 
TENURE_t -0.022 0.676 
CPA_t 3,853 .227 
MBA_t -0.780 .435 
size_t 0.731 0,000 
adjusted R2  0,365 
Regression  0,000 
Observation 
  51 
Source:SPSS 17.0  
 
Based on Table 4 the results of multiple 
regression test hypotheses Second, the value of the 
adjusted R2 of 0.365 which means that the 
variability of increase in compensation of directors 
in 2012 can be explained by 36.5% by the age 
variable directors, past the man of directors, the 
accounting profession degree (CPA), and the title 
graduate (MBA) directors in 2012. the remaining 
63.5% is explained by other variables not included 
in the regression model. 
Under the influence of the simultaneous test (F 
test) was obtained regression significance value of 
0.000 is smaller than 0.05, which means that the 
independent variable financial expertise of directors 
simultaneously together influencing variable 
compensation increases directors (LNΔCOMP). 
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However, when seen from the significant value of 
each variable financial expertise of directors 
obtained a value as follows. Age of directors (Age) 
has a significant value of 0.615. Period servant of 
directors (Tenure) has a significant value of 0.676. 
Directors accounting certification (CPA) has a 
significant value of 0.227. Directors post-graduate 
degree (MBA) has a significance value of 0.435. As 
for the control variables firm size is 0,000. 
Although the simultaneous test (F test) showed 
the second hypothesis is supported not least due to 
the significance level of firm size (Size) 0,000 less 
than 0.05. If the terms of the significance value per 
independent variable age of directors, servants past 
directors, directors accounting certification, and 
post-graduate degree directors have a significance 
value greater than 0.05. Thus, we can conclude the 
second hypothesis is not supported. That is, the 
financial expertise of directors positive effect on the 
increase in the compensation of directors in full 
adoption. 
Based on the partial test (t test) results of the 
second hypothesis regression test output can be 
concluded with a regression equation as follows: 
ΔKOMP = 1,273 + 3,853 CPA - 0.780 MBA - 0,022 
TENURE - 0,024 AGE + 0, 731 SIZE  
The constant of 1.273 states that if the 
independent variables held constant, the increase in 
the compensation of directors amounted to 1,273. 
CPA regression coefficient is worth 3,853, which 
means every variable CPA up one unit will increase 
the directors compensation increase of 3.835 with 
the assumption that the other independent variables 
are fixed. MBA worth the regression coefficient -
0.780, which means every variable MBA rose one 
unit will reduce the increase in the compensation of 
directors amounted to 0.780 with the assumption that 
the other independent variables are fixed. 
Time servant negative coefficient 0.022, which 
means every time variable servant (Tenure) moved 
up one unit will lower variable compensation 
increases of directors of 0.022 assuming that the 
other independent variables are fixed. AGE negative 
regression coefficient of 0.024, which means every 
variable AGE up one unit will reduce the increase in 
compensation of directors amounted to 0,024 with 
the assumption that the other independent variables 
are tetap.Koefesien regression firm size (Size) is 
positive 0.731 means that every variable firm size 
(Size) ride one unit will increase the variable 
compensation increases with the assumption of 
directors amounted to 0.731 other independent 
variables are fixed. 
Control variables significant effect of firm size 
in predicting the increase in variable compensation 
of directors but not financial expertise of directors. 
This is not in line with previous studies that 
examined the financial expertise to the financial 
director compensation increases or bonuses finance 
director in pergatian adoption of IFRS (Loyeung, 
2014). 
Of the four variables that define financial 
expertise accounting certification (CPA), a 
postgraduate degree (MBA), the age of the directors 
(Age), and a man of directors (Tenure) no positive 
effect on the variable compensation increases 
directors. Variable age of directors (AGE), a 
postgraduate degree (MBA), and a man of directors 
(Tenure) did not show the same results in previous 
studies loyeung (2014). This does not indicate that 
employers give more compensation increases based 
on the qualifications of directors accounting (CPA), 
a postgraduate degree (MBA), the age of the 
directors (Age), and a man of directors (Tenure). It 
does not agree with the previous literature that says 
that their accounting qualification (CPA) can reduce 
the concerns of shareholders in managing companies 
(Sun, 2015). 
Moreover, it proves that in Indonesia the 
change does not affect the company's financial 
standards in selecting directors with financial 
expertise better. This is in line with research Guner 
(2008) who found that the compensation of directors 
is not a significant increase to the directors who have 
financial expertise. With the change of financial 
standards will put new pressure on the directors in 
the financial report and implement internal control. 
However, it is not proven in this study. 
Agency theory explains that the principal and 
agent have different interests in menjelankan 
company. With the contract is expected to 
memotivator agent intensive work harder and reduce 
the interest difference. However, in this study it is 
not proven by the practitioner. Principals do not 
provide a boost in the form of increase in 
compensation to his agent at the time of the change 
of the financial standards that require understanding 
and relearning by the agency in preparing the 
financial statements and internal control. 
Lack of encouragement in the form of increase 
in compensation from the principal to the agent can 
be caused by several things. First thing, this could be 
due to the turn-based financial standards of SFAS 
SFAS GAAP into IFRS based pelapran less an 
impact on the company's financial and management 
control of the company. Second, in the absence of 
intensive labor contracts that provide bonuses such 
as cash or stock. This will cause a misalignment of 
interest between the agency with the interests of the 
company. 
Third Hypothesis Testing Results (H3) 
The third hypothesis in this study is the 
financial expertise of directors negatively affect the 
change of directors during the year of IFRS adoption.
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Table 5 Results of regression test a third hypothesis 
  Dependent Variable = Change of Directors of the Year 2012 
variables Regression coefficient Sig 
constants -3234 0552 
AGE_t -0012 0841 
TENURE_t -0046 0482 
CPA_t 2,487 0539 
MBA_t -2499 0068 
size_t 0160 0400 
pseudo R2  0128 
Onimbus Test  0402 
Observation  51 
Source: Data Olah SPSS 17.0 
 
 
 
Based on Table 5 the results of multiple 
regression test hypotheses Third, the magnitude of 
Pseudo R2 value of 0.128 which means that the 
variability of the variable change of directors in 2012 
can be explained by 12.8% by the age variable 
directors, past the man of directors, the accounting 
profession degree (CPA), and the title graduate 
(MBA) directors in 2012. the remaining 87.2% is 
explained by other variables not included in the 
regression model. 
Under the influence of the test simultaneously 
(Onimbus test) was obtained at 0.402 regression 
sinifikansi value greater than 0.05, which means that 
the independent variable age of directors (AGE_ti), 
past the man of directors (TENURE_ti), the title of 
the accounting profession (CPA_ti), and a post-
graduate degree ( MBA_ti) simultaneously together 
does not affect the turnover variable directors 
(ΔTURNOVER). The third hypothesis is not 
supported, which means financial expertise of 
directors (financial expertise) should not adversely 
affect the turn of the directors during the year of 
IFRS adoption. 
Moreover, the significance of each independent 
variable age of directors amounted to 0.841, a period 
of directors servant 0.482, 0.539 accountants 
professional degree and post-graduate degree 0.068 
showed significantly greater value than the value of 
0.05% significance test. So that the results showed 
no significant effect of variable financial expertise of 
directors to replace any directors at year's adoption 
of IFRS.   
Based on the results of logit regression test 
output can be concluded with a third hypothesis 
regression equation as follows: 
ΔTURNOVER = -3.234 + 2.487 CPA - 2,499 MBA 
- 0,046 TENURE - 0.012 AGE + 
0.160 SIZE + ɛ  
constants for -3.234 stated that if the 
independent variables held constant, the change of 
directors has a value of -3.234 one unit. CPA 
regression coefficient 2.487, which means turnover 
worth directors will be increased by 12.025 (e2,487) 
times for each unit increase in directors accounting 
certification (CPA) than companies that did not 
experience the change of directors if other variables 
held constant. MBA worth the regression coefficient 
-2.499, which means the change of directors will 
increase by 0.082 (e-2.499) times for each unit 
reduction directors post-graduate degree (MBA) 
than companies that did not experience the change 
of directors if other variables held constant. 
Regression coefficient tenure worth -0.046, 
which means the change of directors will increase by 
0.955 (e-0.046) times for each unit decrease in time 
servant of directors (Tenure) than companies that did 
not experience the change of directors if other 
variables held constant. Age regression coefficient of 
directors (Age) worth -0.012, which means the 
change of directors will increase by 0.988 (e-0.012) 
times for each unit decrease in the age of the 
directors (Age) than companies that did not 
experience the change of directors if other variables 
held constant. Regression coefficient of firm size 
(Size) worth 0.160 which means the change of 
directors will be increased by 1,173 (e0,160) times 
for each unit increase in firm size (Size) than 
companies that did not experience the change of 
directors if other variables held constant. 
Control variables company size also showed no 
significant effect in predicting the turnover variable 
directors. This is in contrast from previous studies 
(Loyeung, 2014). Zhao (2016) find a company that 
does the reporting back to prefer hiring directors 
62 JOURNAL OF APPLIED MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 
| Vol. 2, No.1, March 2018, Page 51-64| ISSN: 2548-9917 
 
who have accounting qualifications both in terms of 
experience and knowledge of accounting. The 
results of this study do not prove it. 
Bhagat (2010) found that the financial 
expertise berepengaruh no significant play an 
important role in the decision to replace the 
company's directors. This study also found no 
significant effect of financial expertise of directors 
to replace any directors at the time of the adoption of 
IFRS penih. In the implementation, the company 
would seek to memepekerjaan director with 
accounting experience and qualifications better than 
the previous one. However, the results of this study 
contrasts with that. This may be caused by at least a 
sample of firms in this study as well as research time 
using only two years of research. Moreover, it proves 
that in Indonesia the change does not affect the 
company's financial standards in selecting directors 
with financial expertise better. 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
This study provides evidence of the effect of 
financial expertise of directors related to the 
compensation of directors and change of directors in 
non-financial companies in Indonesia in 2011 
through 2012. This study used four variables to 
define financial expertise is accounting certification 
(CPA), a postgraduate degree (MBA) , age directors 
(aGE), past the man of directors (TENURE). There 
are several conclusions that can be drawn from this 
study. First, there are no positive effect of financial 
expertise of directors in Indonesia. Second, there is 
a positive effect of financial expertise of directors to 
the increase in the compensation of directors. Third, 
there are no negative influence between financial 
expertise of directors to replace any directors in 
Indonesia. 
Control variables associated company size 
significantly to the compensation of directors and 
compensation increases. This explains the larger the 
company the greater the rise in compensation and 
compensation can be awarded. However, the age 
variable directors, servants past directors, directors 
of certification and post-graduate degree directors 
failed to define the effect of financial expertise to 
compensation and replacement of directors. This 
may be caused because the low variability of the four 
variables financial expertise in explaining the 
dependent variable. This proves the change does not 
affect the standard of financial reporting and 
management control in non-financial companies in 
Indonesia. 
Moreover in practice the company would 
choose directors who have expertise and 
understanding of accounting, so the owner of the 
company can be more confident in delegating 
authority to the directors. And the company will 
provide compensation and bonuses in intensive 
employment contract as a form of dorangan for an 
agent to work harder. However, in practice the lack 
of educational background of directors holds a CPA 
and MBA, as well as the limitations of working life 
and also the life of the directors in the employment 
contract to make variable the CPA, MBA, age 
directors and a man of directors less into the right 
variables in measuring financial expertise of 
directors in Indonesia. 
This study has several different limitations. 
First, this study uses only two years of research, 
namely 2011 and 2012. As well as limited the sample 
to non-financial companies in Indonesia. 
Researchers speculate that the small study led to a 
lack of representativeness of the sample to test the 
hypothesis. Second, the study only used as a control 
variable sized companies while there are many other 
variables such as the complexity of the work, the size 
of the board of directors, the value of stock returns, 
and others that can be a supporter of research related 
to the compensation of directors. The study only 
examined the overall board of directors related to the 
variables measured using proportions. 
Based on research that has been done on these 
results suggest for the company to hire directors who 
have belekang educational background in business 
and have accounting certification (CPA). In addition, 
the company may consider the compensation and 
compensation increase through time servant of 
directors, directors age, and educational background 
as an MBA and CPA directors owned by members of 
the board of directors. For education, this research 
may be relevant literature and adds to evidence of 
financial expertise, compensation, and a change of 
directors in Indonesia. 
Suggestions for further research are expected to 
increase the scope of the sample in terms of years 
and also studied industrial sector. Further research is 
also expected to add variables related to financial 
expertise for R-square test is obtained by a fairly 
small variability in explaining financial expertise to 
compensation and replacement of directors. In 
addition, further research can also be specifying the 
object of study of the board of directors became 
managing director or finance director. 
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